Back when I was researching Russian military capabilities in the Caspian Sea region, I found that whatever the composition of forces of the Russian Transcaucusus Front a subordinate element, and its subordinate unit the 58th Army, this was not a full mobilization in a traditional sense.

A traditional mobilization would entail filling out three additional motorized rifle divisions, listed as I saw it as Category II, or a low readiness unit.

Aviation available to the Russian Transcaucusus Front include three air superiority squadrons ( MiG-29s and SU-27s ) and three ground intserdiction squadrons(Su-25s). This is a formidable aviation component, but note that even with three bomber units filled out with SU-24s, none of these aircraft are strategic aviation.

The only known strategic aviation in the Transcaucusus area is the TU-22M maritime bomber operated by the Russian Navy.

The Russian Caspian Flotilla nor any Russian naval component would involved in Georgia, because the Russian navy has conducted no combat operations in the Transcaucusus area. The possibility that TU22Ms could be used on the west coast of georgia exists only if there was Russian Navy operating in the area, swnd I have yet to read about any Russian naval involvement in Georgian operations.

The point to this post is that the only strategic bombers in the area are operated by the Russian navy, not the army.

Ballistic missile in use by the army are usually controlled at the very top, even with individual units attached to maneuver units. The Russian general staff would never assent to deploying and using ballistic missiles even when tipped with high explosives and give the decision to fire to a commander of army rank without explicit instructions from Moscow.

You gotta wonder just what was fired at the Georgian Army if it wasn't a ballistic missile.


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