Was the IDF Ready for War? subject logo: MILGAM
2006-08-22
Posted by: badanov

After reading from various sources on the internet, the inescapable conclusion is that the IDF was allowed to fall into a state of lower readiness for war, and the outcome was a flaccid IDF response to Hezbollah.

We kept reading about how the Olmert cabinet was stalling and delaying and taking half measures and now it is easy for us to see why.

If you want to send the best military in the region into battle, they have to be ready for the fight. Clearly, the IDF was not ready for anything.

It may not be that readiness is the only factor which hurt the IDF. It may have also been a change in combat doctrine with Gen. Sharon's plan to disengage from the Palestinians. The IDF was ready for the kind of fighting that the PLO required them to do, but not for the mobile, flexible operations demanded by modern warfare, and in this case Hezbollah.

One element of that kind of fighting is reliance on air power. Air Power is a very potent weapon in modern combat, but it is not the panacea for all defense needs. You still have to have soldiers ready to fight, to take and hold ground against an armed and hostile enemy, and you have to be ready to do this with next to no notice.

It seems clear to us that the IDF was expecting the Israeli Air Force to do the job which required soldiers and risk of casualties. Those fancy F-15s are a fine weapon, but the most effective is the dearest, and that is infantry/engineers on the ground.

The Hezbollah "artillery park" as we called it had been mentioned to us in 2002, and we stated on public forums that the Israelis need to immolate these forces. The Israelis had at least five years to deal with Hezbollah, or in the alterbative, five years to prepare to deal with them.

It's hard to believe that Gen. Sharon chose to do nothing about the growing threat on the Israeli nothern border. We suspect it may have been a political decision by Sharon and/or his cabinet to deal with Hezbollah at a later date.

But the least the General could have done was to demand that the IDF be prepared in the event of hostilities.

The lack of readiness of the IDF is a problem for which blame goes straight to the top, and is a clear component of the dithering that took place immediately after the shooting started.

By our reckoning, we believe the IDF has a year tops before the shooting begins anew. We humbly request the IDF at least prepare to deliver a fatal blow to Hezbollah.

If you have something to add, Fire Away!

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